Bioethics, Public Reason, and Religion is a new book from Center Professor Leonard M. Fleck, PhD. Published this month by Cambridge University Press as part of the Cambridge Elements Bioethics and Neuroethics series, the book is available to read online for free until August 26.
Fleck explores Rawlsian political liberalism, the limits of religious integrity, and examines the issues of physician aid-in-dying, the use of embryos in medical research, abortion, and the artificial womb.
“Given the United States Supreme Court Dobbs decision, this volume is especially timely since it is doubtful that the Dobbs decision could pass the public reason test—though readers are free to disagree with that conclusion,” said Fleck.
Summary: Can religious arguments provide a reasonable, justified basis for restrictive (coercive) public policies regarding numerous ethically and politically controversial medical interventions, such as research with human embryos, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, or using artificial wombs? With Rawls, we answer negatively. Liberally reasonable policies must address these controversial technologies on the basis of public reasons accessible to all, even if not fully agreeable by all. Further, public democratic deliberation requires participants to construct these policies as citizens who are agnostic with respect to the truth of all comprehensive doctrines, whether secular or religious. The goal of these deliberations is practical, namely, to identify reasonable policy options that reflect fair terms of cooperation in a liberal, pluralistic society. Further, religious advocates may participate in formal policymaking processes as reasonable liberal citizens. Finally, public reason evolves through the deliberative process and all the novel technological challenges medicine generates for bioethics and related public policies.
Print copies of the book are also available for pre-order. The volume is a slim paperback, clearly written, and accessible for an undergraduate bioethics course that addresses several of these controversial bioethics issues as matters for public policy decision-making.
Neil Mahoney is 64 years old and has a terminal cancer with a predicted life expectancy of 4-16 months. He lives in Colorado, a state that approved an aid-in-dying law in 2016. His physician is Dr. Barbara Morris, 65, a geriatrician whom he has asked to provide him with the drugs needed to end his life. She has agreed to do just that.
However, Dr. Morris works for the Centura Health Corporation, a Catholic-Adventist hospital system. Dr. Morris was fired from her position when it became public knowledge that she was willing to help Mr. Mahoney to end his life. We should note that she had no intention of doing this within the walls of the hospital or any of its facilities. She would accomplish this in the privacy of Mr. Mahoney’s home.
In justifying its firing, the hospital CEO said Dr. Morris could be fired for “encouraging” the patient to pursue aid-in-dying, even if she never actually provided or assisted in any other way his accessing the drugs he requested. The CEO cited as a basis for this position the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services. The directives state that Catholic health care providers (which include everyone working in the institution, whatever their religious commitments or lack thereof) “may never condone or participate in euthanasia or assisted suicide in any way” (emphasis mine). Instead, “patients experiencing suffering that cannot be alleviated should be helped to appreciate the Christian understanding of redemptive suffering.” Alternatively, the care of that patient should be transferred to another provider, presumably one willing to respect the choice of someone like Mr. Mahoney.
It should be obvious that there is something ethically incongruous about this position. Imagine my walking into a Catholic gun shop in a horribly depressed state of mind and asking the owner to sell me a gun so that I could blow my brains out. He expresses compassion for my awful life circumstances, urges me to seek psychiatric care, then explains that as a Catholic he could not sell me that gun, knowing my intention. Having said all that, he informs me that a mile away is another gun store owned by an atheist who would have no qualms about selling me that gun. Given his religious commitments, would sharing such information be ethically justified?
Let’s translate the answer to that rhetorical question into Mr. Mahoney’s situation. He went to that hospital to get care for his cancer. He did not go there to receive aid-in-dying. However, imagine this situation. His cancer treatment at the hospital is failing miserably. At this point he does request aid-in-dying since he has no interest in redemptive suffering, either for himself or anyone else.
The hospital could transfer him to another hospital where his wish could be fulfilled. However, that sounds like the situation of our Catholic gun shop owner. Alternatively, they could explain to him that it would be contrary to their corporate conscience to effect that transfer. In addition, they believe several doses of redemptive suffering would be therapeutic for his spiritual well-being.
Mr. Mahoney could retain an attorney who would point out that Mr. Mahoney has the legal right to leave the hospital against both medical and spiritual advice. Other patients, however, who might be in much worse medical circumstances (unable to be transferred) would not be able to exercise that right or the right to access aid-in-dying. That brings us to the crux of this essay.
Whose conscience should prevail in this situation? If a physician or other health professional were asked to participate in some way in a request for aid-in-dying, and if such participation were contrary to their deeply held religious or ethical beliefs, we (political authorities in a liberal, pluralistic, tolerant, democratic society) would respect those beliefs and allow them to avoid participating. This is equal and reciprocal moral respect. What would that require if Mr. Mahoney were this latter hypothetical patient stuck in that hospital? Perhaps that would require allowing a physician who was not attached to the hospital to enter the hospital for purposes of providing aid-in-dying. It is hard to imagine Centura agreeing to that.
The alternative would be to allow a member of their medical staff who believed providing aid-in-dying to a patient in these circumstances was both ethically permissible and obligatory to do just that. However, Centura has made clear that no member of that institution would be allowed to do that, thereby imposing their conscientious beliefs on hundreds of staff who might not agree with that belief. This seems contrary to the notion of reciprocal moral respect.
Centura would expect that Catholic physicians in secular hospitals would be allowed to refrain from participating in any act of aid-in-dying. Why not allow non-Catholic physicians (or liberal Catholic physicians) in Catholic hospitals to act in accord with their sense of compassionate conscientiousness in Mr. Mahoney-like situations? There is a political and ethical contradiction here: the hospital is invoking our liberal pluralistic political heritage to secure protection for their conscientious beliefs, but denying that same protection to staff and patients within their walls who disagree with that religious commitment.
The hospital might portray itself as a “religious institution,” though this is misleading at best. It is not a church whose membership is comprised of individuals who freely choose to endorse a specific faith perspective. Hospitals, whether having any religious affiliation or not, are public institutions accepting public money (Medicare, Medicaid, etc.) to care for patients with or without any religious faith. People seek health care in those institutions, not spiritual guidance, and certainly not spiritual coercion.
Noteworthy in today’s health care environment is the acquisition of smaller hospitals by larger hospital chains, including Catholic hospitals absorbing secular hospitals and imposing a Catholic identity on them. Almost 20% of all hospital beds in the United States today are under Catholic auspices. Beyond that, these hospital chains are buying up all sorts of medical practices as a way of assuring a steady (and profitable) stream of patients and patient revenue. In effect, patients are being drafted (unbeknownst to themselves) into a religious environment, potentially to become soldiers in the cause of redemptive suffering.
More problematic, as noted earlier, was that Dr. Morris was going to provide aid-in-dying in the privacy of Mr. Mahoney’s home. Mr. Mahoney was likely not a saint. Still, it is unconscionable that he would have to undergo redemptive suffering for the sake of an institution to which he owed no allegiance to satisfy the conscience of that institution and its CEO.
Finally, a Canadian Catholic hospital was recently legally obligated to make available aid-in-dying to patients in accord with Canadian law. That service would be provided in a building adjacent to the hospital and owned by the hospital. Physicians employed by the hospital would be free to provide that service. This, I conclude, is a reasonable compromise that reflects mutual moral respect regarding an ethically complex situation rather than uncompromising redemptive religious righteousness. This also represents the equal political respect required for the peaceful functioning of a liberal pluralistic society and health care system.
Leonard M. Fleck, PhD, is Acting Director and Professor in the Center for Ethics and Humanities in the Life Sciences and Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Michigan State University.
Join the discussion! Your comments and responses to this commentary are welcomed. The author will respond to all comments made by Thursday, February 6, 2020. With your participation, we hope to create discussions rich with insights from diverse perspectives.
You must provide your name and email address to leave a comment. Your email address will not be made public.
Center Assistant Professor Dr. Devan Stahl recently attended the 2019 Conference on Medicine & Religion, held in Durham, NC. Dr. Stahl was part of a panel titled “”Ask Me about My Uterus:” Theological Responses to Women’s Pain in Contemporary Western Medicine.”
The three panelists, all women living with chronic pain or chronic illness, discussed their experiences dealing with pain, and the theological resources that have helped with that endeavor. Dr. Stahl discussed how the Desert Mothers provide models for understanding and handling pain in illness. Overall, the panel considered “how a theological re- narration of chronic pain might offer insight into the significance of women’s pain as well as resources for meaning-making in the midst of pain.”
How do patients, their families, or their caregivers express hope for a miracle in the clinical setting? How can medical professionals respond to these desires for a miracle to occur?
Guests Dr. Devan Stahl, Assistant Professor in the Center for Ethics and Humanities in the Life Sciences and Department of Pediatrics and Human Development at Michigan State University, and Dr. Trevor Bibler, Assistant Professor in the Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy at Baylor College of Medicine, have written on this topic, with articles published in the American Journal of Bioethics and the Journal of Pain and Symptom Management. In this episode they discuss the framework for categorizing the various ways in which people hope for a miracle, while also drawing from experiences they have had as clinical ethicists. They also discuss the importance of not making assumptions when miracle language is used, emphasizing the need for all religious beliefs to be respected by medical professionals.
This episode was produced and edited by Liz McDaniel in the Center for Ethics. Music: “While We Walk (2004)” by Antony Raijekov via Free Music Archive, licensed under a Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike License. Full episode transcript available.
About: No Easy Answers in Bioethics is a podcast series from the Center for Ethics and Humanities in the Life Sciences in the Michigan State University College of Human Medicine. Each month Center for Ethics faculty and their collaborators discuss their ongoing work and research across many areas of bioethics—clinical ethics, evidence-based medicine, health policy, medical education, neuroethics, shared decision-making, and more. Episodes are hosted by H-Net: Humanities and Social Sciences Online.
Center Assistant Professor Dr. Devan Stahl and Dr. Adam Pryor (Bethany College) are co-editors of the book The Body and Ultimate Concern: Reflections on an Embodied Theology of Paul Tillich, published in October 2018 by Mercer University Press.
Dr. Stahl also contributed a chapter titled “Tillich and Transhumanism.”
Paul Tillich’s account of “ultimate concern” has been crucial for his theological legacy. It is a concept that has been taken up and adapted by many theologians in an array of subfields. However, Tillich’s own account of ultimate concern and many of the subsequent uses of it have focused on intelligibility: the ways it makes what is ultimate more accessible to us as rational beings. This volume charts a different course by placing Tillich’s theology in conversation with theories of radical embodiment. The essays gathered here use discourses on the particularity and mutability of the body to offer a critical vantage point for constructive engagement with Tillich’s central theological category: ultimate concern. Each essay explores how individuals can be special bearers of ultimate concern by engaging the body’s role in faith, religion, and culture. As Mary Ann Stenger, professor emerita from University of Louisville, observes in her introduction: “From concerns about bodily integrity to considering bodies on the margins of society to discussions of technologically modified bodies, these articles offer us fresh theological insights and call us to ethical thinking and actions in relation to our bodies and the bodies around us. And certainly, today, the body and a person’s right to bodily integrity have become central, critical issues in our culture.” Contributors include: David H. Nikkel, Kayko Driedger Hesslein, Beth Ritter-Conn, Tyler Atkinson, Courtney Wilder, Adam Pryor, and Devan Stahl.
Dr. Stahl is President Elect of the North American Paul Tillich Society.
On August 2, 2018, Seth Welch called 911 after finding his 10-month-old daughter, Mary Anne Welch, unresponsive in her crib. Mary was pronounced dead at the scene and the medical examiner determined Mary’s death was the result of malnutrition and dehydration. During interviews, Seth Welch and his wife Tatiana Fusari admitted they were aware of Mary’s skinny appearance for at least a month prior to her death, but claimed that they had fed her appropriately and did not believe her to be ill. The parents are now awaiting trial for felony murder and first-degree child abuse.
The case has made national headlines, because the parents claim their decision not to take Mary to a doctor was based, in part, on their religious beliefs. Mrs. Fusari said she failed to reach out for medical help for her daughter because she feared having her children removed by Child Protective Services, a lack of faith in the medical system, and “religious reasons.” Further, Mr. Welch claims he is being unfairly charged in Mary’s death because of his “very strong faith.” Neither Mr. Welch nor Mrs. Fusari have explained their religious beliefs, but in Facebook videos, Mr. Welch claims he is “not opposed to medicine or doctors,” but he believes some doctors are part of a “priesthood of the medical cult.” He also claims not to believe in vaccines, and expressed a desire to live in a “commune of Christian disciples living off the grid somewhere.” The reasons Mary’s parents did not take her to see a physician appear to be multifaceted, but their claims to religious liberty are a hot button issue in bioethics and politics today.
The case of Mary Anne Welch is yet another in a long line of child neglect and abuse cases where a religious exemption defense is likely to be mounted. All U.S. states have laws prohibiting child abuse and neglect, but 39 states also have laws protecting parents from abuse and neglect charges (though not murder charges) when they fail to provide medical assistance to their children because of their religious beliefs. Religious exemption laws are meant to protect the religious liberty of individuals who use faith-based practices in place of medical science; although in many states the religious exemption only applies to people who are part of “recognized” religious denominations. These exemptions grew out of a Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) ruling after the 1974 passage of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, which specified that religious exemptions be added to states’ child protection laws. In 1983, HEW adopted new regulations that removed the requirement for religious exemption, however, few states have repealed their religious exemption laws. In many states with exemptions, including Michigan where Mr. Welch and Mrs. Fusari reside, courts can order medical services to be provided to a child whose health or life are at risk without medical care.
In nearly all cases, competent adults are free to make medical decisions according to their religious beliefs, and cannot have treatment forced on them for any reason. At the same time, parents have certain obligations toward their children, which restrict their right to exercise their religious beliefs on behalf of their children. In the famous U.S. Supreme Court case Prince v. Massachusetts (1944), the court ruled that “Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves,” but they are not free “to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.”
The case of Mary Anne Welch is a microcosm of a larger debate happening in health care around religious liberty and the rights of children. The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) has stated that parental desires regarding their child’s medical treatment should be followed, unless these decisions clearly go against the child’s best interests. At the same time, for decades the AAP has been opposed to religious exemption laws. In cases where parents are acting maliciously or with gross indifference to the well-being of their child, it is easy to see why overriding parental decision-making would be appropriate. Prosecuting parents for neglect and abuse if their child suffers as a result of their decisions feels appropriate as well. Knowing very little about Mr. Welch and Mrs. Fusari, however, it would be presumptuous to make any judgments about their fitness as parents, or about their care for Mary. At this point it is not clear that given Mary’s weight loss, other reasonable parents in a comparable situation would have taken their child to the doctor regardless of their religious beliefs. Time will tell if Mary’s death should have been foreseeable or if it would have been preventable with proper medical care.
What is likely to happen in the meantime, and seems to be happening already in the media, is that Mr. Welch and Mrs. Fusari’s religious beliefs will be scrutinized. (Their concerns about the dangers of hospitalization are supported by recent studies about medical errors.) Religious exemption laws regarding parental neglect are controversial, and critics are right to question the legitimacy of such laws when children die as a result of their parent’s religious beliefs. Despite their religious beliefs, we ought to hold parents to a standard where they are expected to prevent injuries to their children. At the same time, we ought not to hold parents such as Mr. Welch to a higher standard for parental care, simply because he has particular religious beliefs that are not widely held by other parents. Plenty of parents choose to opt out of certain medical treatments for religious and non-religious reasons alike, and it is not clear that medical orthodoxy should always be determinative of a child’s best interest. Time will tell if other prudent parents would have taken a child in Mary’s condition to the doctor. If that is found to be the case, then Mary’s parents should be held accountable for their decisions.
Devan Stahl, PhD, is an Assistant Professor in the Center for Ethics and Humanities in the Life Sciences and the Department of Pediatrics and Human Development in the Michigan State University College of Human Medicine.
Join the discussion! Your comments and responses to this commentary are welcomed. The author will respond to all comments made by Thursday, October 4, 2018. With your participation, we hope to create discussions rich with insights from diverse perspectives.
You must provide your name and email address to leave a comment. Your email address will not be made public.
On June 14, Center Assistant Professor Dr. Devan Stahl delivered the Jean Vanier Emerging Scholar Lecture at the Summer Institute on Theology and Disability in Raleigh, NC. Dr. Stahl was awarded this lectureship based on her dissertation work and letters of recommendation regarding her scholarship on disability. Dr. Stahl’s lecture was titled, “From Idol to Icon: Transforming Medical Images into DisArt.” Based largely on her recent book, Imaging and Imagining Illness, she discussed how fine art can transform medical images and challenge our cultural associations with disability. Dr. Stahl is the third Vanier Emerging Scholar and co-director of the PhD seminar at the Summer Institute.
.@DevanStahl on why she uses the word “monstrous” in her disability art: “We don’t use the word monster anymore, but sometimes we still mean it.” #SITD18
Thankful for friends like Dr. Devan Stahl (@DevanStahl) exploring the nebulous boundaries of story, identity, and art. Sometimes the only way to capture/gesture towards the holiness of the embodied experience. #SITD18pic.twitter.com/QuIQk9aqrI
Authors Trevor M. Bibler (Baylor College of Medicine), Myrick C. Shinall, Jr. (Vanderbilt University Medical Center), and Center Assistant Professor Dr. Devan Stahl have a target article in the May 2018 American Journal of Bioethics, on “Responding to Those Who Hope for a Miracle: Practices for Clinical Bioethicists.” Additionally, AJOB published correspondence from the authors, “Response to Open Peer Commentaries on “Responding to Those Who Hope for a Miracle: Practices for Clinical Bioethicists”,” where the three authors discuss significant points of disagreement, clarification, and agreement from the responses to their article.
Abstract: Significant challenges arise for clinical care teams when a patient or surrogate decision-maker hopes a miracle will occur. This article answers the question, “How should clinical bioethicists respond when a medical decision-maker uses the hope for a miracle to orient her medical decisions?” We argue the ethicist must first understand the complexity of the miracle-invocation. To this end, we provide a taxonomy of miracle-invocations that assist the ethicist in analyzing the invocator’s conceptions of God, community, and self. After the ethicist appreciates how these concepts influence the invocator’s worldview, she can begin responding to this hope with specific practices. We discuss these practices in detail and offer concrete recommendations for a justified response to the hope for a miracle.
The full text as well as the response are available online through Taylor & Francis Online (MSU Library or other institutional access may be required to view these articles).
Center Assistant Professor Dr. Devan Stahl is co-author of an article published in the February 2018 issue of the Journal of Pain and Symptom Management. “Addressing a Patient’s Hope for a Miracle” was written by Myrick C. Shinall Jr. (Vanderbilt University Medical Center Section of Palliative Care), Dr. Stahl, and Trevor M. Bibler (Baylor College of Medicine).
Abstract: Ill patients may make decisions to continue aggressive life-prolonging care based on hope for a miraculous recovery, and clinicians can find goals of care discussions with these patients extremely challenging. Thus, palliative care providers may be asked to help in these discussions. The concept of “miracle” can express a multitude of hopes, fears, and religious commitments. Effective, sensitive engagement requires the palliative care provider to attend to these variegated hopes, fears, and commitments. This case presents a typology of ways patients express hope for a miracle along with analysis of the motivations and beliefs underlying such hopes and suggestions for tailored responses by palliative care providers.
The full text is available online through Elsevier/Journal of Pain and Symptom Management (MSU Library or other institutional access may be required to view this article).
Give God a rest; do your own gene editing (and thinking). On August 2, 2017 the New York Times headline read, “In Breakthrough, Scientists Edit a Dangerous Mutation from Genes in a Human Embryo.” The mutation was of a gene called MYBPC3, and the result of that mutation is a disease called hypertrophic cardiomyopathy. This disease affects 1 in 500 people. Its victims are typically young athletes. CRISPR-cas9 is the technology used to accomplish the gene editing. More precisely, a synthetic healthy DNA sequence was injected into an egg cell fertilized by a sperm cell with the mutated gene. This healthy DNA sequence was supposed to be copied into the newly created embryo. In fact, however, the maternal DNA was copied, thereby correcting the paternal mutation in 72% of the resulting embryos. A total of 54 embryos were created, later destroyed, after genetic analysis had been done. The remaining embryos were genetically mosaic. This research received worldwide attention.
I want to raise two questions. How should we assess this research and its future possible uses from an ethical perspective? How should we assess public policies designed to regulate this research now and in the future? I am going to give more attention to this latter question in the context of a liberal, pluralistic, democratic political culture because many people would demand that the research itself be outlawed, not just regulated. The relevant question to ask is this: What sort of justification must be given for regulating or banning gene-editing technologies used to create or modify human embryos? The short answer I will defend in response to that question is that regulations must satisfy public reason and public interest requirements (as explained below).
From an ethical perspective, gene-editing technology represents considerable potential benefit, as the example of hypertrophic cardiomyopathy above suggests. At least 200 single-gene disorders could be corrected at the embryonic or pre-embryonic level, thereby preventing premature death or substantial diminishment of quality of life in these future possible children (as well as potential descendants of those children). To be clear, no gene-editing technology is ready for clinical application. Off-target effects remain a problem. From an ethical perspective, the risk-benefit ratio of such interventions today weighs too heavily on the risk side. Researchers, however, are confident that these risks can be overcome.
Assuming that the safety issues can be effectively managed, another ethical objection is that these future possible children (maybe for several generations) would not have consented to such fundamental interventions. I do not see this as a compelling objection. Parents today must consent to very risky surgery or other medical interventions in a two-year old child that could result in the death of that child or substantial lifelong impairment. We have to trust the judgment of parents and physicians in such circumstances. We have to believe they are all acting in the best interests of that child (absent compelling evidence to the contrary). This seems perfectly analogous to what would be occurring with gene-editing of an embryo. (For a broad overview of relevant ethical principles, see Wolpe et al., 2017.)
I now want to switch to concerns in the context of public policy. What sort of political justification would be needed to legitimize the complete banning of gene-editing research on human embryos? Here are two answers that are entirely “out of bounds” in a liberal, pluralistic society: (1) doing gene-editing of embryos is “playing God,” and (2) destroying embryos should never be regarded as an acceptable part of medical research.
The phrase “playing God” invokes amorphous religious associations, deliberately and arrogantly engaging in some life-or-death activity that is the exclusive prerogative of God. However, if this is supposed to be a compelling argument for public policy purposes, then large areas of medical practice would have to be outlawed as well. It might well be the will of God that I die from my heart attack, but I still want my surgeon to be agnostic and do the bypass surgery needed to save my life. God is typically described as being omnipotent, though millions of embryos are created annually with thousands of serious genetic disorders. Allowing those future possible children to suffer the awful consequences of those disorders by forbidding the development of the technology that could correct those disorders looks like willful social negligence, not impiety.
Critics of gene-editing rail against the possible, speculative harms this technology could unleash on future generations of children, all the while ignoring the very real harms current actual children are having to suffer as a consequence of these genetic disorders. This is not just shortsighted; it is ethically and politically perverse. Virtually everyone agrees that it would be premature today to do embryonic gene-editing with the intent of bringing that future possible child to birth. However, nothing would justify laws that would forbid going forward with the research until such time as it would be safe to introduce into the clinic.
Some religious critics will object to the destruction of embryos that will be integral to the development of this technology. We noted above that 54 embryos were created and destroyed in connection with the hypertrophic cardiomyopathy research. Some religious critics will see those embryos as having the moral status of persons with the same rights as you and I. However, this is where public reason must be invoked as the appropriate basis for formulating policy in a liberal, pluralistic society.
Public reason (Rawls, 1996) must be neutral or agnostic with respect to all religious belief systems or other comprehensive worldviews. From an objective, scientific perspective embryos have no capacity to feel pain, no consciousness, no interests, and no personal identity. Embryos are not mini-persons. Some religious adherents may believe otherwise. They are free to affirm that belief in the private social space of their religious community. However, they may not seek to create laws that would effectively impose that belief on citizens who did not share that belief. This would be an illegitimate, illiberal use of the coercive powers of government unless they were able to justify such laws through an appeal to public reasons and related public interests.
Public reasons are reasons that all free and equal reasonable citizens as citizens can accept as reasonable, as consistent with the best science and fair terms of cooperation in a just society. Public reasons are the currency of rational democratic deliberation. Public interests are interests that all citizens have, and that could not be adequately protected or enhanced without the use of the coercive powers of government to control those who would threaten those interests. Protecting air and water quality would be a clear example of a public interest.
A liberal, pluralistic society recognizes and respects many reasonable ways of living a good life. Individuals are free to order their lives in accord with many different reasonable values that do not represent a threat to the rights of others or to various public interests. Consequently, such a society will accept that some people will refuse to use gene-editing technology in the future to alter the genetic endowment of their future possible children. This is political respect for procreative liberty.
It would be illiberal and illegitimate for some political group to use the coercive powers of the state to force religious individuals to use gene-editing technology, contrary to their religious beliefs. Likewise, these religious individuals must be mutually respectful of the procreative liberty rights of others to use gene-editing technology to alter the genetic endowments of their future possible children. This would include paying taxes to support the medical and scientific research needed to develop safe and effective versions of embryonic gene-editing, keeping in mind the taxes needed to pay for the health care needs of children born with cystic fibrosis or muscular dystrophy or any number of other medical problems that could have been avoided with judicious gene-editing.
In conclusion, there can be reasonable disagreement regarding various uses of embryonic gene-editing technology. However, that disagreement will have to invoke public reasons and public interests. God’s will and God’s won’t are not public interests.
Leonard M. Fleck, PhD, is a Professor in the Center for Ethics and Humanities in the Life Sciences and the Department of Philosophy at Michigan State University.
Join the discussion! Your comments and responses to this commentary are welcomed. The author will respond to all comments made by Thursday, December 14, 2017. With your participation, we hope to create discussions rich with insights from diverse perspectives.
You must provide your name and email address to leave a comment. Your email address will not be made public.